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Foreword by the Dutch Presidency
It is with great pleasure that I, invited by the Director of 
Europol, write this foreword for the 2004 edition of the 
public version of the European Union Organised Crime 
Report. First of all, I would like to thank all Member 
States, Norway and in particular Europol for their con-
tributions and efforts to prepare the new edition of this 
annual report.
The 2004 European Union organised crime report is 
published in the year that the EU has grown from 15 to 
25 Member States. An enlarged European Union gives, 
as described in the report, on the one hand organised 
groups more opportunities to expand their criminal ac-
tivities and poses a challenge for the Union. On the other 
hand the accession gives a unique opportunity to com-
bine the efforts of 25 states in fighting organised crime 
on the basis of a common understanding and approach 
at EU-level.
I would like to stress two other important conclusions 
from the report: the trend towards more loose criminal 
networks structures and the fact that collaboration be-
tween criminal groups is much more common than rivalry. 
Loose criminal and collaboration networks are much 
harder to disrupt and it means than we have to think 
hard about new strategies and tactics to tackle these 
networks.
The many recommendations included in the report form 
a good basis for setting priorities and a common ap-
proach. Although much progress has been achieved in 
the last years, a comprehensive EU strategy against or-
ganised crime for the next decade is still needed. In this 
case the Europol report could be very useful.
Therefore I welcome the development of a strategic 
concept with regard to tackling cross-border organised 
crime at EU-level as one of the outcomes in the “The 
Hague Programme; strengthening freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union”, adopted by the European 
Council of 5 November 2004.
In this programme it was also decided that from 
1 January 2006, Europol must have replaced its current 
crime situation report by yearly “threat assessments” on 
serious forms of organised crime, based on information 
provided by the Member States and input from Euro-
just and the Police Chiefs Task Force. The Council should 
use these analyses to establish yearly strategic priori-
ties, which will serve as guidelines for further action. This 
should be the next step towards the goal of setting up 
and implementing a methodology for intelligence-led law 
enforcement at EU level. Much progress has been made, 
but still a lot of work has to be done to tackle organised 
crime in the European Union.
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the 
Netherlands
Johan Remkes
4
Director’s foreword
I am delighted to present the public version of the 2004 
European Union Organised Crime Report (OCR). The pub-
lic version of the OCR provides political level decision 
makers within the law enforcement community, as well 
as many public and private organisations with a con-
densed but comprehensive overview of the activities of 
organised crime in the European Union.
For more than ten years now the production of this report 
has been an example of the growing co-operation 
between Europol and the Member States. This year’s OCR 
is specifically characterised by the fact that the Euro-
pean Union has increased from 15 to 25 Member States 
with a commensurate increase in the volume and variety 
of the input to this year’s report.
For some time it has been recognised that national bor-
ders do not represent a real obstacle for OC. On the 
contrary, borders can prove to be more of a hindrance 
to police activities and can actually provide organised 
criminal groups with an advantage in situations where 
they are active in one country and using another country 
as retreat. From the point of view of security we could 
talk about the existence of a common criminal space.
The growth of the European Union however does not just 
provide organised crime with new opportunities in a com-
mon geographical and political space; it also provides 
the European Union with an opportunity to streamline 
its activities, to become more efficient by overcoming 
national differences in the area of law enforcement.
An effective fight against organised crime needs com-
mon tools. From an operational perspective, such tools 
will help facilitate the smoother running of trans-national 
criminal investigations leading to greater success. At the 
strategic level, such tools will make it possible to define 
the right priorities beyond a purely national perspective. 
The OCR in front of you is one of these tools.
The importance of the OCR is re-emphasised by the fact 
that it is progressively evolving from a situation report 
into a qualitative Threat Assessment. This development, 
and the resulting expansion of recommendations that 
the new approach allows, will make the OCR one of the 
most important law enforcement related documents at 
the European level by providing the most relevant and 
accurate data on OC in a wider context.
Although the OC situation has not changed considerably 
over the last year it is worth noting that the trafficking 
of synthetic drugs poses an ever-increasing threat. The 
movement of OC groups into areas which can be de-
scribed as ‘high profits – low risk’ is also noteworthy.
In addition, I would like to draw your attention to the 
fact that this year’s public OCR also contains individual 
country profiles which provide you with a synthetic na-
tional perspective.
In summary, new opportunities for a successful fight 
against OC can only be based on shared knowledge and 
co-operation amongst all law-enforcement agencies in-
volved. Europol will strive to continue to offer a platform 
which can contribute to the realisation of this ideal, and 
to be an active partner in the development thereof.
Mariano Germán Simancas Carrión
- Acting Director of Europol - 
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Introduction
The Organised Crime Report (OCR) is an annual publi-
cation, which for the first time was published in 1993. 
Since this time, the production mechanism of the report 
has changed considerably. Where the report in the be-
ginning was more or less a compilation of the national 
contributions provided by 15 Member States it has now 
developed more into a threat assessment orientated 
document, based on contributions from 25 Member 
States and contributions from Europol focusing on the 
results of the ongoing operational work in different crime 
areas. In addition, the report also makes use of other 
publications addressing OC related issues whenever 
such publications are appropriate and available.
The primary aim of the report is to obtain and dissemi-
nate information about organised crime (OC) in the EU. 
By nature, the report will focus more on a European 
perspective than on individual national findings. For the 
time being, the report remains the only strategic tool 
being able to take a bird’s eye view on the OC in Europe. 
This will enable national governments and parliaments 
to formulate an EU strategic policy to tackle OC from 
an international perspective. It also supports law en-
forcement decision-makers to set priorities and allocate 
resources, and law enforcement officers to understand 
specific details of OC in a broader context. More details 
on those subjects can be found in the classified version 
of the OCR, which is restricted to law enforcement agen-
cies within the Member States.
The strength of this report is the fact that is been writ-
ten on an agreed methodology over more than a decade 
now. Therefore, a comparison of the findings in the dif-
ferent OCR’s allows to detect long lasting patterns and 
trends in OC. At the same it has to be realised that sud-
den changes in OC (should they occur) will only be re-
flected in next years OCR.
The public version focuses largely on OC groups and 
their activities, an appendix covering relevant political 
and law enforcement initiatives can be found at the end 
of the report.
The OCR does not cover terrorism or terrorist networks. 
In case there is a need to refer to these areas to ex-
plain a specific situation the report will do but in gen-
eral terms these areas are subject to specific reporting 
mechanisms in different fora.
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Overall patterns and general trends
The organised crime situation within the EU is devel-
oping rapidly, however the 2003 contributions did not 
contain suffi cient data to establish the total number of 
OC groups and their number of members active in the 
Member States. The opening of the borders between the 
existing Member States and the Central and Eastern 
European countries and the expanding foreign communi-
ties in the Member States have made OC groups aware of 
the possibilities of expanding their criminal activities.
Ethnic OC groups are increasingly involving in their activ-
ities people of their own social and ethnic environment, 
living in the Member States. Several Member States re-
ported OC groups using political asylum applications to 
get their members into an EU country.
Traditionally, OC groups tended to have one core crimi-
nal activity, however it is becoming apparent that some 
OC groups increasingly have a wider crime portfolio 
and a wider geographical spread where the profit po-
tential is the prime mover. To a certain extent this relies 
on existing experience and knowledge and transferable 
skills but it also creates the need to buy in additional 
expertise or services as discussed below.
The trend towards more loose network structure with 
regard to the set-up of OC groups continues. The roles 
of facilitators and professionals are becoming increas-
ingly important. These are individuals with specific 
skills that are required to conduct certain complex or 
difficult elements of a criminal enterprise. They provide 
their services either within their own OC group or as an 
external service to other OC groups against payment. 
The professionals provide legal, financial, IT and com-
munication and scientific expertise, whilst facilitators 
assist with distribution and warehousing, production 
facilities, corrupt access and forged documents. The 
loose network structured groups are more difficult to 
disrupt by law enforcement as they are more flexible. 
One of the difficult tasks is to identify the key players. 
Some facilitators, such as ethnic Albanian groups have 
managed to actually create a position for themselves 
by which they are able to control certain markets.
OC groups are increasingly taking advantage of the ben-
efits of legitimate company structures to conduct or hide 
their criminal. These legal structures are often abused 
to launder or reinvest profits. Alternatively they commit 
economic crimes such as VAT fraud as a primary activ-
ity.   
The trend for poly-drug trafficking also continues. These 
consignments may be destined for a variety of recipients 
in different Member States, which indicates an increased 
co-operation between OC groups. Such diversifications, 
flexibility and co-operation across national boundaries 
are clear trends within the international drugs market.
The quality of counterfeit euro banknotes is continu-
ously improving because of sophisticated printing facili-
ties and the recruitment of professional individuals with 
considerable printing skills. Lithuanian and Bulgarian OC 
groups are increasingly involved in this type of crime.
Illegal immigration is a growing problem in the Member 
States. The complexity of moving large groups of people 
to a number of countries requires a degree of organi-
sation and sophistication that can only be met by OC 
groups. These OC groups often co-operate with groups 
involved in other types of crime, specifically drugs traf-
ficking, in order to use pre-existing routes and networks 
already established through their activities.
Organised crime seems to be moving more and more 
into areas of ‘petty crime’ like pick-pocketing and shop-
lifting but also burglaries and theft by deception of indi-
viduals, often tourists. Members of OC groups, who often 
originate from Eastern Europe work in small groups and 
are moved around quickly but never stay long in one lo-
cation. Recent information suggests that major sporting 
events are targets for the OC groups.
This development is in line with the realised trend to-
wards ‘high profit – low risk’ crime areas. Prime areas 
here are tobacco and alcohol smuggling but there seems 
to be a widened approach to include additional lucrative 
high ‘profit – low risk’ areas in OC activities.
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The threat from organised crime
OC is becoming increasingly professional, relying on ex-
ternal expertise in an ever widening international and 
heterogeneous setting. OC activities resemble a complex 
industry. For instance, contracts need to be negotiated 
with (multiple) suppliers and sub-contractors, funds need 
to be raised, goods need to be transported, stored and 
distributed, documents need to be produced, and secu-
rity of the operation needs to be maintained. In some 
cases OC groups are known to exploit the absence of or 
delay in political initiatives, or the unforeseen, negative 
consequences of these, as well as judicial change or 
technological advances. Another tool used by OC groups 
is corruption, which is an efficient method of achieving 
criminal successes. This is likely to become more pro-
nounced in the years to come. 
Certain factors play a major role in determining which 
OC groups pose the greatest threat. Aspects such as 
impenetrable group membership, increasing interna-
tionalisation, the level of establishment which certain 
groups have reached in today’s transnational licit or illic-
it markets, and the extent of their penetration into legal 
economies through the hotel, banking or transportation 
sectors, for example, are fundamental. 
Major OC groups
The following chapter outlines the involvement and the 
threat of indigenous and non-indigenous OC groups in 
the EU. Generally, OC groups appear to be developing 
towards a loose network structure. These networks are 
more difficult to disrupt since it is more difficult to tar-
get the key figures of the organisation. ‘Facilitators’ are 
becoming more important for OC groups. These are in-
dividuals with a particular useful skills who offer their 
services to a number of different OC groups. For example 
in the fields of finance, chemical production, printing 
and counterfeiting. 
Indigenous OC groups
In most Member States organised crime is dominated by 
indigenous OC groups. These groups are well established 
in their own country and are more familiar with the cul-
tural, legal and economic structure of their own country. 
Collaboration with non-indigenous OC groups has be-
come more common. Besides providing extra skills and 
business opportunities (which increases profits) this 
also divides the risks of detection by law enforcement.
Italian OC groups, the most widespread indigenous OC 
groups, are an example of this. Being renown for their 
ethnic composition they are increasingly developing ex-
ternal co-operation with other OC groups.
Certain indigenous OC groups are known for their spe-
cific expertise in certain crime areas. Lithuanian OC 
groups have developed currency counterfeiting skills 
making Lithuania an important source country for coun-
terfeit euro banknotes. Dutch indigenous OC groups 
remain the main producers of synthetic drugs for the 
EU market.
OC groups from outside the EU
Ethnic Albanian OC groups have established themselves 
in many Member States. The criminal activities are con-
trolled by OC groups in Albania, Kosovo and FYROM. They 
continue to extend their role from facilitators for other 
OC groups to achieving full control in certain crime ar-
eas, such as drugs trafficking, illegal immigration and 
trafficking in human beings, in specific regions. 
Ethnic Albanian OC groups are hierarchal, disciplined 
and based on exclusive group membership. The signifi-
cance of ethnic Albanian OC groups in the overall EU 
context is further increasing. Italy and Greece consider 
ethnic Albanians to be the largest non-indigenous OC 
group in their countries. Albanian OC is considered an 
increasing threat to the Member States.  
Chinese OC groups are expanding their criminal activi-
ties in the EU becoming more involved in the smuggling 
of precursor chemicals and the production of synthetic 
drugs. Production units in which Chinese nationals were 
involved have been dismantled in The Netherlands and 
Belgium.
Along with Malaysian OC groups, Chinese OC groups are 
involved in credit card fraud in the EU. Stolen credit card 
information is bought from hackers and used to make 
forged credit cards with which they purchase luxury 
goods. These are then converted to cash on the black 
market.
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Chinese OC groups facilitating illegal immigration are 
well organised. They control every stage of the illegal 
immigration process for Chinese immigrants, but do 
co-operate with other OC groups in this venture. The OC 
groups known as ‘Snakehead gangs’ are known to be vio-
lent towards the immigrants and their relatives in their home 
country. The individuals exploited by Chinese OC groups are 
transported throughout Europe and through debt bondage 
are forced to work in the illegal labour market. 
Chinese OC groups are increasingly seeking new destina-
tion countries for illegal immigrants. Finland and Greece 
have noticed an increase in the number of Chinese im-
migrants. The threat posed by these Chinese OC groups 
is significant and increasing.   
It is difficult to establish the line between Russian OC 
groups and OC groups originating from other countries of 
the former Soviet Union. Only a few of these OC groups 
have a homogenous ethnic base such as Chechens, Ar-
menians, Azerbaijanis, Georgian and Ingush often play 
a significant role. Russian OC groups have an impact 
on all the EU Member States being involved in virtually 
every type of organised crime. A large number of these 
groups are based in the Baltic States. They are involved 
in a wide range of crime types and are constantly look-
ing for new criminal business opportunities such as the 
increasing engagement in cigarette smuggling to the EU, 
mainly to the Nordic countries and the UK.
Lithuanian OC groups are involved in drug traffick-
ing (mainly synthetic drugs), trafficking in human be-
ings, illegal immigration and stolen vehicle trafficking. 
The crime that gives Lithuanian OC an international di-
mension is currency counterfeiting. They are extremely 
skilled counterfeiters and they are constantly developing 
and improving their work. High quality euro counterfeit 
notes, produced by Lithuanian OC groups have been 
seized in Germany, The Netherlands and France. Refer-
ences to Lithuanian OC groups can be found almost in 
every Member State contribution. 
The money laundering procedures of Polish OC groups 
are considered highly efficient and diversified. Corrup-
tion and violence are common practise and the territory 
they control includes not just major town and cities but 
also smaller towns and villages. Polish OC groups are 
involved in property crimes (specifically in Germany), 
currency counterfeiting, drug trafficking and trafficking 
in stolen vehicles. 
With Poland having the longest border of the new Mem-
ber States, including the enclave of Kalingrad, Polish OC 
groups’ territorial control is important for all kinds of 
illicit trafficking from Eastern Europe towards the EU. All 
other OC groups are aware of this and appear willing to 
establish links with Polish OC groups to facilitate their 
own criminal business.
The penetration of Polish OC in the Member States is 
still limited but given the tendency towards co-operation 
with other OC groups as service providers their involve-
ment in international organised crime can be considered 
a serious threat.
Romanian OC groups have expanded their criminal ac-
tivities in the EU. They have specialised in trafficking in 
women and minors for sexual exploitation, forgery of 
documents, extortion, debit card fraud and property 
crime. Their role in drug trafficking appears to be tak-
ing place in Northern Italy and Spain although Romania 
itself is an important transit country for Turkish and Al-
banian drug traffickers.
The number of property crimes involving Romanian OC 
groups, including pick-pocketing and distraction robber-
ies, is increasing. Romanian OC groups appear to be 
very mobile when committing property crimes. They often 
visit a location for just one day to commit their crimes 
and move on to another location the next day. This ‘crime 
tourism’ is done because it is difficult to tackle by law 
enforcement.
Romanian OC groups often operate in small cells. De-
spite their apparent autonomous activities these cells 
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are often part of a larger hierarchical OC group. These 
are pyramidal organisations with strict centralised con-
trol and a clear division of tasks.
Bulgarian OC groups have established themselves par-
ticularly in trafficking in women for sexual exploitation, 
various counterfeiting activities, especially euro counter-
feiting, and debit card fraud. 
The OC groups involved in trafficking in human beings 
are highly mobile, making use of existing communities 
throughout Europe and moving both individual group 
members and victims across borders. Victims are re-
peatedly sold amongst various OC groups.
The counterfeit euro banknotes made by Bulgarian OC 
groups are especially distributed in France, Greece, Italy 
and Spain after entering the Schengen area via Austria 
or Germany. The banknotes are imported by small groups 
who return to Bulgaria immediately after making deliv-
ery. Although there is co-operation with other ethnic OC 
groups, the money couriers, middle men and distribu-
tors are almost always Bulgarian. Distributors are often 
recruited through newspaper advertisements and are 
briefed about the legislation of the country they are sent 
out to and trained how to react to the police in case of 
an arrest.
Former Yugoslavian OC groups are involved in many 
types of property crimes such as burglaries, ram-raids 
and armed robberies. Members of these groups are tak-
en in small vans to certain locations in Member States 
to commit burglaries.
Members of former Yugoslavian OC groups have also 
been involved in motor vehicle crime in Spain (mainly 
Croatians and Bosnians) and The Netherlands (mainly 
Serbs), the transport of alcohol to the Nordic countries 
and the transport of chemical drugs from The Nether-
lands for their local market using Austria and Slovenia 
as transit countries.
There is little information about the structure of former 
Yugoslavian OC groups. They appear to work as a hori-
zontal cluster of different independent groups. Referenc-
es to the activities of Former Yugoslavian OC groups can 
be found in most of the EU Member States.
Most Member States report on nationalities rather than 
on ethnicity. This makes it specifically different to always 
distinguish between Kurdish and Turkish OC groups.
The heroin trade remains the major organised crime ac-
tivity of these groups although they are also engaged in 
poly-drug trafficking indicating co-operation with other 
OC groups. Turkish OC groups are increasingly linked to 
ethnic Albanian OC groups. Furthermore their experience 
in areas such as transportation, company formation and 
facilitation management is used for organised crime ac-
tivities in the field of illegal immigration and trafficking 
in human beings. Turkey is an important transit coun-
try for illegal immigration to the EU from, for example, 
China.  
Turkish OC groups are known to be involved in an array 
of legal businesses which are likely to be a method of 
laundering proceeds of heroin trafficking. Restaurants, 
bars, fast-food franchises, real estate agencies, travel 
agencies and vehicle repair shops are examples of such 
businesses. 
Nigerian OC groups supply cocaine and herbal canna-
bis to EU Member States and smuggle women into the 
EU who are exploited in the prostitution business. Their 
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victims are subject to extreme pressure and in some oc-
casions voodoo rituals have been employed in order to 
force the girls and women to prostitute themselves.
Moroccan OC groups also play a major role in the im-
portation of cannabis products to the EU. Morocco re-
mains by far the most important source country for can-
nabis coming to the EU. Furthermore reports suggest a 
stronger involvement of Moroccan OC in the trafficking 
of cocaine and synthetic drugs in some of the Member 
States.
Morocco plays a significant role as a source and transit 
country in the illegal immigration flow especially towards 
Spain. The OC groups involved are mainly clan based, 
relying on former drug dealer networks and local com-
munity chiefs. They operate independently by dividing up 
operational zones amongst themselves but they do pro-
vide each other with such expertise as may be required 
to carry out specific tasks.
Colombian OC groups operate, apart from Colombia, 
in other Southern and Latin American countries from 
where they control the production and global traffick-
ing of cocaine and associated money laundering. Solid 
indigenous criminal networks in several Member States 
guarantee the wholesale distribution across the EU. The 
structure of Colombian OC groups is fragmented and de-
centralised and they often co-operate with other groups 
linked to flexible networks.
Pakistan is a transit country for the trafficking of Afghan 
heroin destined for the EU market. It is also a major 
source country for cannabis resin. Besides this, Paki-
stani OC groups facilitate illegal immigrants heading for 
Greece, The Netherlands and Spain. These immigrants 
are often kept in bad conditions and are exploited until 
they have paid off their debt to the traffickers.
Indian OC groups facilitate the illegal immigration of In-
dians to Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, The Neth-
erlands, Slovakia Spain and the UK. These OC groups 
use Italy and Austria as important transit countries. In-
dian OC groups are often not hierarchically structured. 
Rather, they are loose cells often based on family ties 
or common origin (same village). These OC groups are 
known to co-operate with OC groups of other nationali-
ties, for example ethnic Albanian and Surinamese.
Types of crime
The move away from single types of criminal activity (e.g. 
drug trafficking) to diversification into multi-crime ac-
tivities (e.g. drug trafficking, commodity smuggling and 
illegal immigration) is a continuing trend.
The involvement of OC groups in facilitating crimes 
against persons, with a specific focus on facilitating il-
legal immigration and trafficking of human beings, as 
one of the most lucrative high profit – low risk crime 
areas, is still worth highlighting, taking into the account 
the social, political and economic disturbances that this 
form of organised crime causes in the EU.
The field of crimes against persons is multi-faceted of-
ten intrinsically linked to other OC activities. This may 
involve crimes that facilitate illegal immigration, such as 
forgery and counterfeiting of documents or identity theft, 
or other crimes such as drug trafficking, when migrants 
carry drugs as part payment for their journey. In addition, 
this area of crime has an ongoing and often negative im-
pact arising from the continued (often illegal) presence 
of migrants in their host countries. 
This crime type is already classified as a priority area for 
the Member States and at EU level. This priority setting 
should not change.
Crimes against persons
Illegal immigration is a growing problem within the EU. 
The complexity of moving large numbers of immigrants 
across great distances requires a degree of organisation, 
specialisation and sophistication that can only be met 
by OC groups. To a large extent, the OC groups facilitat-
ing this type of crime can be found within the ethnic 
specific communities already present in the EU and its 
new Member States. This can be seen as an important 
pull factor. OC groups often co-operate with each other, 
particularly in moving commodities across multiple bor-
ders/states often making use of pre-existing routes and 
networks established by OC groups involved in drugs 
trafficking. The profits that can be made from facilitat-
ing illegal immigration, in comparison to the attendant 
costs and risks make it a business that is attractive for 
organised crime. Many of the countries that were known 
as transit countries en route to the EU are increasingly 
11
exploited by facilitating OC groups as destination coun-
tries in their own right, reflecting the eastwards spread 
of prosperity as the EU enlarges. The boom in Chinese 
illegal immigration to the EU is particularly noteworthy.
On a global scale, Trafficking in Human Beings is a 
EUR 8.5 to EUR 12 billion per year business. Women 
victims of this type of crime are, in most cases, forced 
into illegal prostitution and often suffer from extreme 
violence (rape, assault, torture and even mutilation) and 
extensive control by their pimps. The OC groups involved 
are also known to threaten the victims’ families in case 
their victims are not obedient. In order to help break 
the women’s resistance to prostitution they are disori-
entated by often being sold from one pimp to the other 
and transferred between working places. Eastern Europe 
(Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania), Africa (Nigeria) 
and Asia (China, Thailand) remain important source 
countries.
The majority of child pornography images and videos 
seized in the Member States appear to be produced 
in the former Soviet Union states, South Eastern Asian 
countries (particularly Japan) and, increasingly, South 
America. The proliferation of commercial pay-per-view 
websites is an increasing threat. The evolution of Inter-
net payment systems provides improved anonymity for 
both the supplier and the customer. In 2003, enhanced 
international co-operation and co-ordinated actions be-
tween states has resulted in the identification and ar-
rest of thousands of members of the online paedophile 
community. 
Extortion cases are closely related to a wide range of 
crimes and can be associated with the threat of violence. 
Traditionally extortion is a means of territorial control. As 
a new development, cases of Chinese OC groups who 
are involved in the extortion of Chinese restaurants and 
casinos have been reported. Furthermore there is an in-
crease of the extortion of large retail stores. This new 
development might be an indication that similar forms 
of extortion also take place in other ethnic communities 
within the EU.
Drug traffi cking
Drug traffi cking remains the most common form of 
trans national organised crime in the EU. The Member 
States remain a major consumer market for all types 
of illicit drugs. Well established OC groups in the Mem-
ber States guarantee the wholesale distribution across 
the EU. The trend of poly-drug traffi cking continues. These 
types of consignments may be destined for different re-
cipients in different Member States indicating an increased 
co-operation between OC groups involved in drug traffi cking. 
The cocaine supply is still dominated by Colombian OC 
groups who have their networks established in Europe, 
however OC groups within the EU are also in direct con-
tact with suppliers in South America and the Caribbean. 
It is estimated that each year approximately 250 tonnes 
of cocaine are transported to the EU by sea. EU Law en-
forcement agencies seized almost 90 tonnes of cocaine 
in 2003.
On a global level, illicit poppy cultivation declined by 6 
per cent in 2003 to 169,000 ha, equivalent to a poten-
tial heroin production of 480 tonnes of which between 
60 and 100 tonnes is thought to be destined for the EU. 
In 2003, only 14 tonnes of heroin were seized by law 
enforcement in the EU but this is the highest quantity 
ever. Some 90 per cent of heroin on the market origi-
nates from South West Asia. Extensive commercial trade 
between Asia and Europe and a good infrastructure of 
land, sea and air connections provide ample opportunity 
for the trafficking of heroin to Europe. Turkish OC groups 
still dominate the heroin market are involved in all as-
pects of the criminal business from the poppy fields in 
South West Asia to the markets in Europe, although the 
involvement of Albanian OC groups in increasing. A close 
co-operation between these two groups is developing.  
Most of the 50 to 70 synthetic drugs production sites 
that were dismantled in the EU during 2003 were lo-
cated in The Netherlands and Belgium. It appears that 
couriers are now aware that flights arriving directly from 
The Netherlands and Belgium will be subject to closer 
scrutiny and therefore choose to travel by an indirect 
route. In apparent confirmation of this Germany reports 
increased trafficking of Dutch ecstasy destined for the 
US and Australia.
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Investigations in Member States revealed a growing 
number of synthetic drug production sites in Estonia 
(especially for the Finnish market), Serbia, Poland and 
Germany. There is also an increased involvement in syn-
thetic drug production of Turkish, Moroccan and Chinese 
OC groups. Chinese OC groups are of particular interest 
as, in the past, they have been mainly responsible for 
the smuggling and distribution of precursor chemicals. 
Advanced production methodology, the use of sophis-
ticated equipment and the involvement of skilled spe-
cialists have resulted in an ever increasing production 
efficiency and capacity. The production process, from 
chemical synthesis to the end product of packaging, 
now invariably takes place in separate locations, occa-
sionally even in different countries. This division of tasks 
reduces the risks for OC groups of an inclusive produc-
tion network being dismantled when one site is being 
discovered by law enforcement. 
Morocco remains the principle source for cannabis resin 
(hashish) for the EU. Albania, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
are also important source countries of cannabis resin. 
This type of drug remains the most commonly used drug 
in the EU.
Herbal cannabis (marihuana) is supplied to the Mem-
ber States from Colombia, Jamaica, South Africa and 
Nigeria. Albania has developed into an important source 
country for this type of drug, specifically for the Greek 
and Italian market.
In 2003, approximately 900 tonnes of cannabis resin 
and 52 tonnes of herbal cannabis were seized by law 
enforcement in the EU.
In France the number of incidents involving the illegal 
trafficking of anabolic and doping substances more
than doubled from 65 in 2002 to 136 in 2003. A large 
part of these substances are discovered in mail and 
express freight. Ephedrine is especially imported from 
Pakistan often after being ordered on the Internet. Oth-
er substances required by users are stanozolol, clen-
buterol and testosterone. Sweden also experienced 
an increase in the seizure of doping preparations with 
the Baltic States, Thailand, Greece and Spain being the 
main suppliers.
Financial crime and other crimes against property
It has been reported that possible money laundering 
activities by means of money transfers through the Cash 
Deposit System (CDS) are increasing. Accountholders 
are often straw men and forged bank cards are used to 
withdraw the money all of which further increases ano-
nymity.
Those Member States reporting on money laundering 
all noticed an increase in suspicious money transfers 
and money laundering cases with money transfers, land 
and real estate purchases still being the most common 
modus operandi.
Skimming, which is the copying of data encoded within 
the magnetic strip of debit cards, and hacking, which in-
volves the electronically breaking in to databases which 
contain credit card data are two main categories of pay-
ment card fraud. Thirteen Member States are closely 
working together to fight this type of organised crime.
The quality of counterfeit euro banknotes is continu-
ously improving because of the sophisticated printing 
facilities and the recruitment of professionals with con-
siderable printing skills. The vast majority of counterfeit 
euro banknotes are produced in Bulgaria, Lithuania, 
Poland, Albania, Turkey and Kosovo. In 2003, a total 
of more than 570,000 euro notes were seized by law 
enforcement and banking systems in the EU with an es-
timated value of around EUR 30.000,000. The price of 
a counterfeit bank note is estimated at approximately 
8 per cent of its face value. The price can increase to 
up to 35-40 per cent once the bank notes reach their 
final distributor whose aim is to introduce the forged 
money into the market place in exchange for real money 
or goods.
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Organised robberies, burglaries and theft
Several Member States noticed a significant increase in 
organised robberies, burglaries and theft by a number 
of different OC groups originating from Eastern Europe 
and former Yugoslavia. Crimes such as ram raids or 
armed robberies against jewellers’ shops, breaking into 
ATMs, burglaries of shops selling hi-tech equipment or 
stealing personal belongings from tourists by a form of 
deception are often committed by OC groups originating 
from these countries.
In Eastern Europe, Portugal, Spain and North Africa there 
is a willingness to purchase stolen construction site ma-
chinery. This concerns mainly (mini) excavators, backhoe 
loaders, compressors, fork lift trucks and loaders. These 
objects are stolen from construction sites in the EU and 
transported on stolen platform lorries. 
Other commodity traffi cking
Spain reports the growing number of vehicles stolen in 
car-jacking cases (obtaining the keys to the vehicle by 
threatening with violence) and home-jacking cases (ob-
taining the key to the vehicle by breaking into a house). 
The reason for using this modus operandi  is the im-
proved security systems now fitted in high value vehi-
cles. Especially Bulgarian, Russian and Romanian OC 
groups are mentioned in this respect.
Germany and Austria remain important transit countries 
for stolen vehicles being transported towards Eastern 
Europe while Greece is the route for stolen vehicles des-
tined for Eastern Europe, Middle East and Asia.
Tobacco smuggling used to be a form of fraud almost 
exclusively confined to Italy and, to a lesser extent, 
Spain but this is no longer seems to be the case. Since 
the abolition of intra-community frontiers tobacco smug-
gling has grown rapidly throughout the EU, particularly 
in the UK, France, The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, 
and Germany (where it covers 90 per cent of all rev-
enue and customs offences) even though Italy remains 
the crossroads for the illegal tobacco trade because of 
its geographical position in the heart of the Mediterra-
nean. A significant branch of tobacco smuggling is the 
counterfeiting of well known tobacco brands. In 2003, 
two factories producing fake tobacco products were dis-
covered in the EU, both equipped with efficient Russian 
machines. OC groups choose mainly to export cigarettes 
brands preferred by UK customers because of the price 
of a packet of cigarettes is so high there.
The Nordic countries are important destination countries 
for alcohol smuggling. OC groups involved in this type 
of crime mainly originate from Sweden, Norway, Poland, 
Russia and the Baltic States who have strong links to 
former Yugoslavian OC groups. The alcohol smuggled 
originates, in many cases, from Spain, Italy and Portu-
gal.
Cases of illicit fire-arms trafficking investigated in the 
EU continue to show the involvement of former Yugo-
slavian OC groups. The Netherlands also reported the 
involvement of suspects originating from the UK, the US 
and Turkey as key players within OC groups. Fire-arms 
originating from Croatia are made in legal and illegal ar-
moury work shops and fire-arms trafficked from the Bal-
kan region are often stolen from military warehouses.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations (excerpt) are based on 
the national contributions to the 2004 OCR and the 
findings as a result of the work done at Europol until 
mid 2004:
Policy-oriented recommendations
1.  The council act of 27 November 2003 amending 
the Europol Convention is still not ratified by six-
teen Member States. Although a lot of future plan-
ning documents are already based on the foreseen 
changes of the convention it has to be realised that 
the non-ratification will delay the putting into prac-
tice of the envisaged improvements.
2.  The council act of 30 November 2000 proposing 
an amendment of the Europol Convention in the 
area of money laundering still is not ratified by nine 
Member States. As money-laundering is seen in 
the heart of all OC activities the ratification of the 
aforementioned council act should be prioritised to 
enable Europol to focus its activities in this area to 
better contribute to the fight against OC. 
3.  The council act of 28 November 2002 referring to 
the participation of Europol staff in joint investiga-
tion teams (JIT) is still not ratified by thirteen Mem-
ber States. It is recognised that JIT’s provide the 
the proper framework with an operational focus to 
tackle OC from a European perspective. To be able 
to make full use of the JIT concept the finalising 
of the ratification process remains of major impor-
tance.
4.  On 01 May 2004 ten new Member States joined 
the EU. Until the accession a lot of support was giv-
en by the ‘old’ Member to the ‘new’ Member State, 
especially focussing on the exchange of existing 
experiences and expertise. These efforts should 
continue as they will further contribute to the de-
velopment of a common understanding in the fight 
against OC at EU level
5.  In combating all forms of international OC, a proper 
balance is needed between national and EU-wide 
interests and priorities, in order to meet the Unions’ 
objective to create a high level of safety within an 
area of freedom, security and justice.
6.  To prevent crime, or to reduce crime opportuni-
ties is a very successful strategy to fight OC. Crime 
prevention/opportunity reduction involves a vari-
ety of different players, many of whom are outside 
the scope of law enforcement. Nevertheless, crime 
proofing (take steps to assure that new or amended 
legislation, products or services do not create new 
opportunities for to commit crime) can be a suc-
cessful approach to combat OC at an early stage. 
Therefore ongoing initiatives in this area should be 
continued.
7.  To be more successful in the area of illegal immi-
gration and trafficking in human beings a further 
harmonisation of EU directives covering asylum 
and visa policy should be implemented as soon as 
possible. Common visa issuing offices in identified 
‘black spots’ have the potential to contribute sig-
nificantly towards improved law enforcement suc-
cesses. Consideration should be given to the de-
velopment of a uniform format for all EU visas and 
passports as well as the implementation of the Visa 
Identification System.
8.  The measures introduced by the United Nations 
Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms, their parts and components 
and ammunition will provide new possibilities to EU 
Member States to improve international co-opera-
tion on information exchange and tracing of fire-
arms. So far four EU Member States have ratified 
the protocol, fourteen have signed it and seven have 
not yet signed it. A prompt ratification and imple-
mentation of the protocol by all remaining Member 
States is necessary. In this context attention should 
also be drawn to the EU Framework Directive on 
Firearms, which in addition to the UN protocol also 
covers the control of acquisition and possession of 
firearms.
9.  Law enforcement efforts to efficiently fight OC will 
always fall short from being successful if these 
efforts are not accompanied and supported by 
measure taken in other areas. Especially the area 
of counterfeiting of goods illustrates the need for a 
close co-operation between law enforcement agen-
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cies and the private sector to exchange information 
and to develop common strategies to successfully 
act against these forms of crime. Efforts to intensify 
public-private partnerships should be continued.
Operationally relevant recommendations
10.  The area of drug trafficking is more or less ‘sta-
ble’ with the exception of synthetic drugs. The fight 
against synthetic drugs should be prioritised.
11.  Cultivation of cannabis within the EU and neigh-
bouring countries has been reported in the 2004 
OCR as being an increasing problem. Therefore 
political and law enforcement initiatives aimed at 
eradication should be developed at an EU level. In 
this context reference should also be made to the 
Council Resolution on cannabis (Cordrogue 59 - 
7/7/2004).
12.  A successful fight against illegal immigration and 
trafficking in human beings also requires the in-
clusion of third countries in the law enforcement 
strategies. Therefore, information exchange and 
technical co-operation between source, transit, and 
destination countries in the area of training and ex-
ercising border control should be further enhanced 
(good practice).
13.  A network of National Expert Contact Points should 
be formalised for the purposes of transnational in-
formation exchange and continuous sharing of in-
formation in the field of combating illicit trafficking 
of firearms. Secure information exchange solutions 
should be created to support the activities of this 
network. (Project ARROW)
14.  Counterfeiting of goods as the prime area of ‘low 
risk - high profit’ activities by OC groups has moved 
up to an altogether higher scale, especially with 
reference to cigarettes and tobacco. It is recom-
mended to prioritise law enforcement activities and 
to enhance cross-border co-operation in this area.
15.  Fighting the counterfeiting of the Euro remains a 
crime area which should be prioritised by law en-
forcement agencies. OC groups from the Balkan 
Region seem to be very much involved in these 
criminal activities.
Intelligence requirements
16.  The OCR is developing from a descriptive situa-
tion report into a evaluating Threat Assessment. 
Although this development is not finalised it has 
to be realised that an additional dimension in the 
perspective of how to report on OC needs to be 
considered: the actual harm of OC activities and its 
economic impact. Therefore it should be considered 
to also create a measurement to operationalize the 
actual harm potential of OC activities, as the harm 
level will also influence the setting of priorities at a 
European level.
17.  The vulnerability to corruption of the public and 
the private sector needs to be properly evaluated. 
A clear-cut picture on the use of corruption by OC 
groups does not exist. To be able to realistically 
evaluate the situation it would be required to pro-
duce a specific Risk Assessment for this type of 
crime.
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18.  To be able to develop a sound and unified EU law 
enforcement information platform it is recommend-
ed to intensify the approaches to harmonise data 
collection models beyond national level. Only such 
harmonisation will provide an environment for a 
meaningful cross-European data comparison.
19.  Not much is known about the involvement of OC 
groups in ‘non-traditional’ OC areas. Therefore situ-
ation reports in the areas of high-profit/low-risk 
crimes such as environmental crime, organ smug-
gling and trading in hormones with a focus on the 
involvement of OC groups should be initiated.
20.  Based on reports from some Member States a 
hypothesis can be drawn that OC is also moving 
into areas of ‘petty crime’ like pickpocketing and 
shoplifting, where the involvement of highly struc-
tured criminal organisations is emerging. It is rec-
ommended to obtain further information in this 
area from the MS to be able to draw a complete 
picture of the situation. In case this development is 
confirmed, additional new strategies to tackle this 
specific form of OC need to de developed and im-
plemented.
21.  The increasing use of professionals is a constant 
trend reported in previous issues of the OCR. The 
services offered by professionals such as legal, 
financial and tax advisors, IT and communication 
experts and chemists is essential to the functioning 
of OC groups increasingly involved in transnational 
crime. A risk analysis of this phenomenon at an EU 
level should be encouraged with the aim to identify 
the appropriate countermeasures.
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Country profi les
This chapter summarises the findings of the 2004 OCR 
with a specific focus at national level. As not all Member 
States were able to provide a national contribution to 
the 2004 in time this chapter only refers to those coun-
tries providing a national contribution. In addition, this 
chapter also refers to Norway although Norway is not a 
member of the EU. Nevertheless Norway has been close-
ly associates with the EU over the last years and the 
given geographical situation together with the fact that 
Norway is contributing to the OCR on a voluntary basis 
the national situation is also reflected in this chapter.
Austria
Austrian OC groups mainly consist of multiethnic gangs 
from Southern and Eastern Europe. They are involved 
in smuggling drugs and people, organised trafficking in 
stolen vehicles, assistance with illegal immigration and 
international trade in firearms. A significant trend that 
has been identified is the growing ethnically-based set-
tlements of southern European origin in which local rep-
resentatives receive their instructions from the various 
countries of origin concerned. 
Due to its geographical position Austria is used as a 
transit country for east-west or north-south movements. 
Synthetic drugs are smuggled from The Netherlands to 
Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Polish and Af-
rican criminals also take part in this crime area. Criminal 
organisations smuggle women out of the former East-
ern Bloc countries (primarily Romania and Bulgaria) as 
well as from South America and Asia. This crime area is 
dominated by Austrian gangs. 
Austria continues to be used as a safe haven for Russian 
and Italian criminals. Especially the Russian organisa-
tions see Austria as a quiet location where the top-level 
members of such organisations educate their children 
or install their families or possibly themselves. For years 
now there have been signs in Austria of property pur-
chases increasingly being undertaken by persons or 
companies from FSU. The members of the five criminal 
associations identified in Italy that are styled on the Ma-
fia continue to use Austria as a refuge and an operations 
base for conducting their strategic activities.
Ram raids against jewellers’ shops were on the rise, pre-
sumably committed by eastern European gangs or gangs 
from the former Yugoslavia; Polish groups are also active 
in this crime area.
Belgium
The main activities of the Belgian OC groups are drug 
trafficking, money laundering, tax fraud, swindle and ag-
gravated theft. Falsification of documents is mostly com-
mitted as accessorial or supporting activity. Belgian OC 
groups consist of more than one third Belgian nation-
als. Other established nationalities were Dutch, Italian, 
Moroccan, Albanian and Romanian. There has however 
been a decrease of number of Belgian nationals and a 
rise of Roman and Bulgarian nationalities during 2003. 
Over a longer period, it can be stated that the number of 
Italian OC groups continues to rise, especially in those 
areas where there’s a large Italian community.
In spite of the overall tendency towards globalisation, 
international collaboration amongst criminals still re-
mains limited. Only one fifth of the criminal organisa-
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tions in Belgium have international contacts. These in-
ternational contacts are limited mainly to the European 
Union, namely with The Netherlands, Germany, Italy and 
the UK. The international activities of Belgian OC groups 
are aimed towards The Netherlands, Germany, France, 
Luxemburg, the UK, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Lithuania and 
Switzerland.
Cyprus
OC appears to be less developed in Cyprus. The present 
crime groups operate locally and their structure is based 
mainly on kinship and common interest in gaining profit. 
The predominant nationalities are Greek-Georgian and 
Greek-Russian, mainly involved in distribution of narcot-
ic substances, burglaries, thefts from cars, extortion and 
robberies. Cyprus recently has become a destination for 
illegal immigrants, which use Cyprus as a leaping stone 
for other European Countries. The OC groups that organ-
ize the traffic are from abroad, mostly from neighbouring 
countries. Money launderers appear to use accounts in 
Cyprus, the companies they use being either established 
abroad or in Cyprus, but no hard evidence on this could 
be found.
Denmark
The level of OC in Denmark was once more relatively 
modest in 2003. In some areas OC in Denmark is on a 
par with the level seen in other countries. This is prima-
rily crime originating in the biker community, and crime 
that has links with criminal networks from Eastern and 
Central Europe. 
To an increasing extent, OC in Denmark seems to be 
based on flexible network co-operation. For example, it 
is often found that people in smuggler networks sup-
ply many different recipients in several countries and 
co-operates in variable constellations, and that the net-
works are involved in the form of crime that is currently 
thought to yield the highest profits. 
Danish criminals are mainly involved in narcotics crime, 
financial crime, trafficking in human beings and smug-
gling of goods that are subject to high levels of tax. The 
characteristic of these OC groups is their dynamic and 
changeable nature. The biker and street gang community 
played a dominant role in these types of criminal activi-
ties in Denmark during 2003. A number of street gangs 
were established in several Danish cities in 2003. The 
members of these gangs are typically boys or young men 
with immigrant backgrounds, but groups of Danish eth-
nic origin also exist. The street gangs are to some degree 
involved in activities which are of the nature of OC.
Denmark’s biker community is dominated by the interna-
tional biker organisations the Hells Angels and the Ban-
didos. Both the Hells Angels and the Bandidos are con-
tinuing to expand internationally, in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Asia.
Finland
OC in Finland is dominated by two distinct groups: Esto-
nian and Russian groups on one hand and outlaw mo-
torcycle gangs on the other. 
The most serious threats in the field of OC in Finland 
emerge from the international activities of Estonian, Es-
tonian-Russian, and Russian criminal organisations and 
their impact on the development of organised criminal 
activities in Finland. 
During the recent years, outlaw gangs, among them a 
significant number of gangs affiliated to the interna-
tional outlaw motorcycle gangs, have taken a significant 
role in the organised criminal activities in Finland, and 
an exceptionally large number of new outlaw gangs have 
emerged. Particularly in prisons, the number of outlaw 
gangs has thrived, and as a consequence, the number of 
violent incidents has increased rapidly. 
One of the most significant means of acquisition of in-
come for the outlaw gangs is the large-scale traffick-
ing of drugs and hormones which yields quick and high 
proceeds. 
Trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration are 
growing threats in Finland. The number of cases of ar-
rangement of illegal immigration as well as the number 
of persons brought illegally into Finland is on a slow 
and steady increase. Facilitating illegal immigration and 
trafficking of human beings will probably continue its 
increase in Finland. Most of the persons who entered 
Finland illegally were from the area of the former Yugo-
slavia, Iraq, Turkey, Somalia, and Nigeria.
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France
French OC is very much alive and typically involves a 
large number of foreign nationals, particularly from the 
new EU Member States. The crime gangs are able to ex-
ploit all kinds of new money-making activities and easily 
switch to other operating methods, thereby making the 
task of investigators more difficult. One example of this 
is the rise in the number of armed robberies on tobac-
conists, which has gone hand in hand with an increase 
in tobacco prices. Violence is also an increasingly wor-
rying development, affecting both the law enforcement 
officers and the victims of crime.
Overall, France serves as a transit point for hashish and 
cocaine moving further north and synthetic drugs and 
heroin moving to Southern Europe. While most of these 
groups are controlled by French nationals, it should be 
noted that there are growing links between French OC 
groups involved in drug trafficking and those from, or 
based in, other European countries. For cocaine smug-
gling, the involvement of French networks was found to 
be minimal. Cases recorded in 2003 involved networks 
organised by Colombian traffickers operating in France, 
with intermediaries in Spain or The Netherlands. For 
heroin, networks operating in France consist mostly of 
Turkish, Albanian or African nationals. For the redistribu-
tion phase, these networks work together with French, 
Algerian, Moroccan and Congolese nationals. 
The nationalities of traffickers actually smuggling ecsta-
sy into France are difficult to establish but the networks 
behind the trafficking seem to be British, Spanish and 
Italian. In addition to drugs trafficking these groups are 
also involved in facilitating illegal immigration, traffick-
ing in human beings, trafficking in stolen vehicles, finan-
cial crime, property crime and commodity smuggling.
French OC groups are also active in Luxembourg (kid-
napping, armed robberies and extortion) and Spain 
(drug trafficking, money laundering, forgery, racketeer-
ing, fraud and armed robberies). Indeed the increase 
in armed robberies in Spain can be partly attributed 
to French groups and their participation in attacks on 
armoured trucks and jewellers, utilising both specialist 
skills and violence.
Germany
As in previous years, OC in Germany is dominated by 
German groups. Turkish organised groups also have 
an impact on the OC situation in Germany followed by 
Lithuanians, Poles and Russians. Compared with previ-
ous years, the increase in the number of Lithuanian OC 
groups is particularly noteworthy.
As in recent years, German groups were primarily involved 
in drugs trafficking (especially cocaine and cannabis 
products), economic crime and crime associated with 
nightlife. The activities of all the groups together were 
focused primarily on the following crime fields: drug traf-
ficking and smuggling, property crime, economic crime, 
smuggling of illegal immigrants and crime associated 
with nightlife. The only crime type that increased in re-
gards to last year was arms trafficking. 
Only one in four OC groups was involved in more than 
one form of criminal activity. This represents a continua-
tion of the trend towards groups focusing increasingly on 
single areas of crime in order to maximise their profits. 
As before, groups involved in more than one criminal 
activity had a higher average OC rating than groups in-
volved in just one field of crime.
Greece
The most predominant crime areas for OC groups in 
Greece are: illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, traf-
ficking in human beings, forgeries and trafficking in sto-
len vehicles.
Almost 40% of the suspects have the Greek national-
ity, followed by Albanians, Bulgarians, Pakistani and 
Turks. Greek criminal organisations are mainly involved 
in trafficking in human beings, illegal immigration, fraud, 
forgery, blackmail and trafficking in drugs. The Albanian 
suspects display the most intense activity among the 
non-indigenous groups. By co-operating with Greek na-
tionals they expand their illegal activity mainly in traf-
ficking of drugs (cannabis, heroin) from Albania into 
Greece, trafficking in human beings for sexual abuse, 
thefts and robberies and illegal immigration. Bulgarian 
criminal organisations are involved in forgery, counter-
feiting, trafficking in human beings for the purpose of 
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sexual exploitation and trafficking in drugs. Pakistani 
and Turkish criminals are mostly involved in illegal im-
migration.
Hungary
Drug crime is a major activity of Hungarian OC groups. 
Marijuana is the most common drug, mainly produced 
in Hungary while the rest comes from The Netherlands 
and former Yugoslavian states. In synthetic drugs there 
are two new trends: the appearance of Kosovo Albanians 
(formerly active along the ‘Balkan route’) as coordinators 
and the growing role of Dutch citizens resident in Hun-
gary and associated with drug producers and distribu-
tors in other European countries. Albanian ‘procurement 
groups’ mainly purchase heroin from Turkish wholesale 
traders who use Hungary more and more to establish 
heroin storage facilities, just as they do in Bulgaria and 
Romania. Certain Arab groupings also take part in the 
distribution of heroin in Hungary and there is a growing 
presence of Bulgarians, Romanians and Nigerians.
Other important crime areas are trafficking of illegal 
immigrants, where detection rates decrease due to the 
use of better quality forged documents and economic 
crime. The same applies to trafficking of human beings. 
As far as counterfeited or illegally transported genuine 
cigarettes are concerned, these are firstly stored in Hun-
gary, and then transported to illegal storage facilities in 
Austria and Germany and from there into the UK where 
they are sold.
The cross border activities are mostly aimed at Austria, 
Germany, Slovakia, Ukraine and Italy.
The nationalities involved in OC in Hungary are mainly 
Hungarian, Bulgarian, Chinese and Serbian and Mon-
tenegrin. 
Ireland
The majority of the suspects involved in OC in Ireland 
continue to be Irish nationals with only a very minor 
involvement of non-nationals.  Where there is an involve-
ment of non-Irish criminals, this occurs mainly outside 
of Ireland, namely as contacts of Irish criminals living 
abroad. Moreover, it seems that all of those involved in 
OC in Ireland are known to each other and in many in-
stances have co-operated in their efforts. This is a some-
what unique situation in the European context and may 
partly explain why there is so little involvement of other 
nationalities in Ireland.
Drug trafficking is the most significant form of criminality. 
The most common types of drugs smuggled into Ireland 
are cocaine, heroin and cannabis. Cannabis and cocaine 
are sourced in Spain and in many instances Irish nation-
als now resident there arrange for the purchase of the 
drugs. Heroin is smuggled mainly from the UK again us-
ing Irish nationals resident in the UK. Ecstasy continues 
to be sourced mainly in Holland and as with the other 
types of drugs use is made of Irish national resident in 
Holland.  Where the Irish nationals are not directly in-
volved they do, in many instances, provide introductions. 
However there remains an amount of contact with other 
criminals who are also the source of drugs destined for 
the Irish market. There is some evidence that Ireland 
continues to be a transit point for some drugs although 
this is less significant than in previous years.
The smuggling of cigarettes through Ireland using recog-
nized trade routes for consumption in the UK is also an 
important activity of the Irish criminal organizations.
Italy
As in previous years, the OC in Italy is dominated by ma-
fia type organisations. The criminal organisations are op-
erating in a heterogeneous fashion and function accord-
ing to a specific geographical structure. Next to Italian 
OC some non-indigenous crime groups have been very 
active in the last few years; the most prevalent nation-
alities being the suspects originating from North Africa, 
Romania, Albania and Nigeria. However, this activity by 
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non-indigenous groups relies on the granting of ‘authori-
sation’, permission by Italian OC for territorial autonomy 
and specific areas of activity, so that power relations are 
maintained and profits are optimized.
In Northern Italy, a stronger presence of traditional mafia 
organisations was noticed, mainly operating in the areas 
of money laundering, contracts and drug trafficking on 
an international scale. There is also a further expansion 
of foreign criminal organisations, in particular Albanian, 
Chinese and Nigerian and more recently Romanian, 
sharing various criminal activities and particularly those 
related to the production and distribution of illegally 
manufactured products. In Central Italy the traditional 
mafia attempts to penetrate the financial world in or-
der to launder their illegal profits. Next to the mafia, 
gangs made up of individuals from developing countries 
have been established, mainly active in drug trafficking, 
exploitation of prostitution, marketing of falsified trade-
marks and running of illegal gambling places.
In Southern Italy the criminal phenomena are more 
wide-spread and complex. The mafia has a more direct 
involvement in contracts, sub–contracts and supplies. A 
tendency to concentrate the economic and financial in-
terests in the hands of an ‘elite’ has emerged, delegating 
other activities like drugs, usury and extortion to lower 
profile individuals. The ‘Ndrangheta is less visible but is 
better structured and more widespread, both at national 
and international level, with groups that report back to 
the land of origin. They try to corrupt public contracts 
and are also very active in national and international 
drug trafficking. Other criminal groups often request their 
collaboration for their drug provisions. In general terms, 
camorra is composed of a variety of highly autonomous 
criminal realities. They have a wide field of activities: 
smuggling, drugs trafficking, dumping of illegal waste, 
exploitation of prostitution and trafficking in counter-
feited currency and bonds. Camorra organisations do 
not allow much room for foreign organisations. Howev-
er, some foreign groups, especially Albanian, Nigerian 
and Chinese have acquired some autonomy in manag-
ing drug trafficking, exploitation of prostitution and the 
black market of their own clandestine compatriots. 
Apulia’s criminal groups are the first example of in-
terethnic crime integration, especially with the arrival of 
Albanian OC that participates in trafficking of human be-
ings and drug trafficking. They are mainly active in man-
aging the logistics of cigarette smuggling; fraud against 
the EU (in the areas of tomato growing, oil and wine 
production); usury, currency counterfeiting and mafia-
type crimes like extortion and intimidation. They have a 
strong influence on the Adriatic coasts and collaborate 
with Greek, Russian. In the terms of the scale of serious 
and organised criminal involvement, drugs’ trafficking, 
especially but not exclusively Class A drugs, poses the 
greatest single threat to the UK.  Chinese criminals and 
criminals from former Yugoslavia.  
The cross border activity of Italian groups is mainly 
aimed at, France, Spain, The Netherlands, and Eastern 
Europe, including the Balkans. 
Lithuania
Lithuanian OC groups are mostly focusing on vehicle 
theft, drug related crimes, racketeering, smuggling and 
robberies. At an international level, they are primarily 
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active in Russia, Germany, UK, Byelorussia, Spain and 
Latvia. A major part of the OC groups in Lithuania are 
considered to have a high level of organisation. Impor-
tant foreign ethnicities are Chechens, Chinese and indi-
viduals belonging to travelling communities.  
Luxembourg
Luxembourg OC groups are involved in a wide variety of 
crimes: mainly fraud, drug trafficking, vehicle theft, rob-
beries and burglaries. All groups based in Luxembourg 
have international contacts. Further characteristics are 
a clear division of labour and the use of commercial 
structures. In a third of the investigations, it was de-
tected that different groups are collaborating with one 
another. In 2003, there was a rise in the use of violence. 
Although investigations haven’t been concluded yet, and 
therefore, any conclusion must be taken with caution. 
Luxembourg signals two crime area’s where political asy-
lum is abused. One concerns trafficking in hard drugs,
where a cellular network is dominated by Nigerian OC. 
A significant part of the suspects, mainly of Western Af-
rican origin, had asked for political asylum in Luxem-
bourg. However, most of them stayed already for some 
years in the European Union and were involved in politi-
cal asylum procedures in The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 
Austria and Switzerland. The goal of this organisation 
seems to provide its members with a legal position. 
When the asylum procedure in one country is put to an 
end, they just apply in another country. This organisation 
is rapidly gaining influence and gets the drugs from The 
Netherlands. Secondly, South-Eastern European gangs 
are responsible for burglaries. Often, these criminals are 
engaged in the procedure to obtain political asylum in 
Belgium, Germany, France and The Netherlands.
Poland
Polish OC groups mainly consist or Polish nationals fol-
lowed by Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians and 
Russians. Their main activities are economic crime, 
drugs production and distribution, extortion, thefts of 
vehicles and Euro counterfeiting.
Chechens, Afghan and Vietnamese groups are consid-
ered to be the most dangerous ethnic groups that are 
active in Poland. There is also an increasing threat from 
Ukrainian groups, caused by the growing illegal cultiva-
tion of cannabis in Ukraine and Turkish criminals, con-
trolling the smuggling of heroin from Turkey through Po-
land to western European countries.
Moreover, the drug market presents the most interna-
tional crime area. Polish criminals export amphetamines 
to Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Great Britain and 
Holland, using their own distribution networks. On the 
other hand, Nigerian, Kurdish and Turkish groups ac-
tive in Germany, The Netherlands and Spain try to re-
cruit drug couriers in Poland. Last but not least, there 
are Polish criminal groups carrying out armed robberies 
on jewellery shops in Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and Denmark.
Due to its specific geographical situation Poland is used 
by OC groups as a transit country in the areas of illegal 
immigration and trafficking of human beings mainly from 
Asia.
Portugal
The most common nationalities that are involved in OC 
in Portugal are Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Moldavian 
and individuals belonging to travelling communities. The 
groups are mainly engaged in the following crime types: 
drug trafficking, economic and financial crime, violent 
crime, trafficking and cloning and ringing of stolen vehi-
cles and money laundering. The overall activity of OC in 
Portugal fell in 2003 with the exception of drug traffick-
ing. Most striking was the fall in violent OC as a result of 
the breaking-up, in previous years, of Eastern European 
gangs which specialised in providing help with illegal 
immigration, trafficking of human beings, sexual exploi-
tation, extortion and other related crimes.
Portugal is still important on the Atlantic route for drug 
trafficking, principally due to its long-established rela-
tions with Africa and Latin America. Cocaine arrives 
mainly through seaports, and to a much lesser extent 
through airports, from South America, principally Brazil, 
Colombia and Venezuela. Hashish mainly arrives by sea 
from Morocco or overland from Spain. Heroin however, 
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normally arrives overland from Spain, The Netherlands 
and Turkey. Likewise, ecstasy reaches Portugal mainly 
overland from Spain and from The Netherlands. 
Concerning illegal immigration, Portuguese authorities 
anticipate an increase of persons arriving from Brazil 
— traditionally linked to illegal immigration and traffick-
ing of women for prostitution. They also consider it likely 
that there will be an increase in the numbers of illegal 
immigrants arriving from Arab and Muslim States, but 
this will be due to the stepping-up of checks on such 
arrivals in line with the war on terrorism.
Slovakia
In 2003 OC groups in Slovakia focused their activities 
on trafficking in human beings and commodity smug-
gling. In those crime areas Slovakia is not only a transit 
but also a destination country. 
Highly latent economic crime is still more and more 
committed by OC groups linked to OC groups abroad. 
To reach their goals, offenders commit the most serious 
crimes like homicides, kidnappings etc. Banking and non-
banking institutions, European funds, insurance, savings 
companies are becoming attractive objects of interest 
of OC groups. They use fictitious companies, false docu-
ments, payment cards, bank cheques and protective 
stamps to get to a profit. To protect their interests they 
often need to use “brutal force”. To use it they illegally 
traffic in arms and explosives, which they subsequently 
use to intimidate their competing OC groups, damaged 
victims or witnesses of their main activities.
Slovenia
Slovenian criminal groups are largely associated to other 
groups in the Balkan region, due to connections to the 
former common state. A lot of members of Slovenian 
criminal associations (Slovenian nationals) originally 
come from areas of the former Yugoslavia, and they 
maintain family, friendly and criminal contacts in those 
areas.  This specific situation is used by OC groups in 
Slovenia to facilitate illegal immigration. 
There is also a strong presence of Hungarian and Molda-
vian criminals who are active in crime against low-profile 
targets such as shops, supermarkets and houses. Slov-
enian authorities further detected smuggling channels 
for weapons from the area of South-Eastern Europe to 
the EU countries and even to other continents. Nation-
als of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia working in the 
EU countries are acting as couriers. A number of smug-
gling cases to The Netherlands were discovered; there 
the weapons are usually paid for in drugs, which were 
taken back to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia by the 
same couriers. In July 2003, an unlawful import of the 
radioactive element Cs 137 to Slovenia and an attempt 
to take it out of the country and then to Italy was dis-
covered.
Lastly, Slovenia noticed a considerable increase in the 
distribution of counterfeited Euros and they expect the 
phenomenon to increase even further.
Spain
A total of 101 different nationalities were identified in 
the known OC groups in Spain during 2003. The most 
predominant nationalities are: Spanish, Romanian, Co-
lombian, Moroccan and Serbian and Montenegrin. The 
increase in Romanian criminals (1.018), is significant, 
they represent now 10% of the total number of sus-
pects. 
Within the EU, associations are noted between Span-
ish OC group members and Italians, Portuguese, French, 
Germans, British and Dutch, these are the same nation-
alities as last year. As a matter of fact, the Spanish OC 
groups are the ones that showed the highest level of col-
laboration with other criminal groups. They are followed 
by Colombian, Moroccan, Russian and Belgian organiza-
tions. OC groups in Spain are mainly involved in drug 
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trafficking (mostly cocaine and hashish), documents 
forgery, money laundering, burglary and trafficking of 
human beings (white slave trade and prostitution).
With regards to drugs, Spain continues to be one of 
the most important transit countries in the EU. Almost 
70% of the cocaine seized in the EU was intercepted in 
Spain. Colombian and Spanish drug-traffickers control 
the cocaine trade. Most of it comes from Colombia, Peru 
and Bolivia. Similarly, 65% of all the hashish traded in 
Europe, is thought to pass through Spain and before 
onward shipment to other countries by truck. Most of 
it comes from the North of Africa, with Morocco as the 
main exporter. Synthetic drugs are trafficked on a large 
scale by Israelis and Dominicans and their suppliers 
usually are from Dutch origin. Moroccans control the 
trafficking of synthetic drugs on a middle scale. In the 
area of heroin trafficking Spain is not to be regarded as 
a transit but a consumer country. The substance comes 
mainly from Afghanistan, being sent to Turkey, from where 
it is delivered to other countries. In Spain, the delivery 
of heroin is controlled by groups stemming from the 
travelling communities and, to a lesser extent, by Sub-
Saharan Africans and nationals from Cape Verde. 
The threat posed by the increase in groups made up 
of individuals from Eastern Europe has been confirmed. 
They are mainly settled in large cities and along the 
Mediterranean coast, extending to South-eastern areas 
and to the islands. In particular, Estonian and Russian 
based gangs organise the traffic of cannabis resin, co-
caine and alcohol to Northern Europe.
Sweden
The most common criminal activities reported in Swe-
den are economic crimes, drug-related crime, smuggling 
of alcohol and tobacco, violent crime and illegal trade 
in firearms. A significant number of networks are also 
stated to be operating within smuggling of alcohol or 
tobacco. As to economic crime, tax crime in connection 
with use of black labor has been the predominant phe-
nomenon that has been reported in 2003. Evasion of 
VAT in connection with trade within the EU is a phenom-
enon that also exists within the tax crime sphere.
A significant number of OC groups in Sweden have an 
international connection. As to smuggling activities con-
nections exist above all to other countries in the Baltic 
Sea region and the south of Europe. The links to the 
countries in the Baltic Sea Countries mostly concerns 
smuggling activities. Within the field of economic crime, 
the most common links are with other EU Member States. 
In most cases members of the networks live and operate 
in Sweden. Some exceptions among smuggling networks 
exist where members live abroad and operate against 
Sweden from there.    
The Netherlands
The OC groups based in The Netherlands continue to play 
a pivotal role in the drugs market, they distribute mainly 
to surrounding West European countries. The number of 
investigations into trafficking of cocaine increased sub-
stantially; with an increase of Dutch suspects (from 23 
to 33%). The Netherlands Antilles are important as tran-
sit areas for cocaine from South America. The number of 
investigations into heroin showed a relatively sharp de-
crease in 2003, it is still to a large extent dominated by 
homogeneous Turkish groups. Ecstasy is also exported 
the United States and Australia. In addition to the high 
involvement of Dutch suspects in trafficking in synthetic 
drugs, ethnically homogeneous criminal associations 
from Turkey, the People’s Republic of China, the United 
States and the Dominican Republic are also active in 
this area. Trafficking in soft drugs presents a fairly sta-
ble picture, but the number of Dutch suspects rose from 
38 to 70 per cent. The OC groups from The Netherlands 
active in the area of trafficking soft drugs are predomi-
nantly homogeneous in ethnic composition.
UK
In terms of the scale of serious and organised criminal 
involvement, drugs trafficking poses the greatest single 
threat to the UK. British OC groups are engaged in the 
trafficking in heroin, cocaine (including crack) and ec-
stasy. To that extent, they closely co-operate with other 
indigenous groups, such as Spanish and Dutch groups. 
They have even set up bases in Spain and The Nether-
lands to facilitate the trafficking to the UK. Heroin trade 
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is dominated by Turkish groups but there is an increasing 
significance of other groups, including British Caucasian 
criminals, South Asians and West Africans. Colombians 
still play a major role in cocaine trafficking but British 
and other European criminals are gaining influence as 
traffickers in their own right. The UK wholesale ecstasy 
market is supplied mostly by British, Dutch and Belgian 
criminal networks.
Other threats detected in the UK relates to facilitating of 
illegal immigration, fraud, money laundering and hi-tech 
crime.
Norway
The Norwegian authorities have been noticing a change 
within the OC groups active in Norway. It seems to be a 
development in the direction of increased level of or-
ganisation among the criminals. The networks are work-
ing like criminal entrepreneurs shopping needs and 
expertise when and wherever necessary. They seem to 
organise out of functional aspects instead of belonging. 
Traditionally the criminal networks did specialise in a 
certain modus operandi, or in certain areas.
Drug related criminality is the main concern regarding or-
ganised crime. During 2003 the police focused on cases 
involving bigger volumes of drugs, instead of the end of 
the line drug users. More serious cases than in previous 
years were uncovered. The total volume of drug related 
cases are decreasing, but the volume of drug seized is 
increasing. The criminal networks seem to be more often 
organised from abroad than earlier, and especially from 
the Eastern European countries. These networks are re-
sourceful and well organised. Criminal networks traffick-
ing drugs, are using violence and threats as a mean to a 
bigger extend than previously.
Criminal networks in Norway have long tradition smug-
gling alcohol. Traditionally there has been a sharp dis-
tinction between networks smuggling alcohol and drugs. 
This seems no longer to be the case. The volume of al-
cohol seized in 2003 dropped dramatically due to the 
death of 15 persons after they had been drinking poi-
soned alcohol containing methanol. Nevertheless, it is to 
be expected that smuggling of beer and original liquor 
will further increase in the future.
Criminal networks do also smuggle cigarettes, meat and 
capital goods as cars and leisure boats.
A few police districts are reporting about networks trad-
ing in human beings and trafficking in women. It seems 
to be concentrated around the Oslo region. Cases re-
ported are few, but increasing. Huge dark numbers in 
this area are expected. These networks are also doing 
other illegal acts, as smuggling of drugs, car thefts etc.
Hells Angels MC, Outlaws MC and Bandidos MC are es-
tablished in Norway and pose a threat concerning or-
ganised crime. They are well organised and have close 
international connections. The 1% members are involved 
in smuggling and distribution of drugs, weapons and 
prostitution.
There are some well-organised networks in the region of 
Oslo, mainly involved with armed robberies. The modus 
operandi is marked by brutal well-planned operations, 
where sensitive information has been gathered by threat 
and/or the use of corruption.
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